Summary

The info action “Cardanoの生きがい - Ikigai -” is constitutional.

Understanding of facts

The format of the proposal is valid.

It is an info action per technical standards of CIP-1694 and article 3 section 5 of the Interim Constitution. The Interim constitution does not directly say there is a requirement for the language a governance action is given in, but Article 3 section 6 suggests any governance action should require standardized and legible format including an URL and hash linked to documented off chain content. The info action uses the @language tag as per the CIP-0100 and is otherwise also standardized and in a legible format.

Constitutional languages as related to the task of judging constitutionality of a governance action.

To make the interim constitution accessible it has been translated into several other languages with the note that “This version of the Cardano Constitution has been translated from the original.” Only the version that matches the on-chain hash is the “official” Cardano Constitution. The Intersect Council uses the language in the official hash of the Interim Constitution (currently English) to judge the constitutionality of the proposal.

The info action as the Intersect Council understands it.

The Intersect Council notes that the info action is in Japanese, with supporting material submitted with a CIP-0100 language tag that the Intersect council understands to correspond with Arabic, Bengali, German, Greek, English, Spanish, French, Hindi, Bahasa Indonesia, Italian, Korean, Maori, Portuguese, Russian, Swahili, Urdu, Vietnamese and Chinese.

Based on the supporting material in english, and matched with translation tool to the original Japanese proposal - the Intersect Council understand the proposal to be about the gratitude and respect to IOG, Emurgo and Cardano Foundation. It acknowledges they brought Cardano to the world and that this embodies the essence of Ikigai (sense of purpose or reason of being) and a pledge that the Cardano community will build on this foundation with such a common sense of purpose and with collective wisdom, passion and energy.

That this info action is an expression of community sentiment also seems clear from the ending of the rationale, where the supporting materials seem to match the Japanese submitted info action version: “This governance action is intended only to offer congratulations and to vote on the community’s sentiment, and does not directly or indirectly request any specific changes within the Cardano ecosystem, either off-chain or on-chain. DReps and SPOs should vote YES if they share this sentiment, NO if they do not, or abstain if they are unsure.”

In short the info action is presented as a community statement in regards to this expression of gratitude and spirit of purpose and in line with the requirements in article 3 section 5 of its intended purpose as a community sentiment.

The Intersect Council is examining the constitutionality in terms of the requirements for such an info actions in the Interim Constitution. The first question is if an info action that declares itself to be having no intended effect on-chain or off-chain is something the Intersect Council should vote on, even if only in terms of its constitutionality. The other questions relates to the multiple languages in the supporting material as well as the Japanese language used for the governance action itself, which raises a principle question of the constitutionality of info actions in multiple languages and in other languages than the official hash version of the Interim Constitution.

Is an info action declaring itself to have no intended on-chain or off-chain effect something the Intersect Council could vote on?

Article 6 section 1 describes the Constitutional Committee limits: “The Constitutional Committee shall be limited to voting on the constitutionality of governance actions. The Constitutional Committee shall comprise a set of Ada holders that is collectively responsible for ensuring that on-chain governance actions prior to enactment on-chain, are constitutional. (..)”

“Prior to enactment” could be interpreted to mean that only actions that are going to be enacted should be judged for their constitutionality from a textual interpretation. It could also mean from a textual interpretation that any governance action could be judged but the criteria is that the judgement should happen “prior to enactment” thus not excluding info actions that are not enacted. This seems to have support in the previous sentence “shall be limited to voting on the constitutionality of governance actions” especially when info actions is defined in the constitution in article 3 section 5 as “A special form of governance action exists to allow community sentiment to be gauged without committing to any on-chain change. Info actions have no on-chain effect other than recording the votes on the action.”

From a logical and consistency standpoint it would make sense for the constitutional committee to also be able to vote on all info actions given that they are included in the constitution as a governance action, the constitution committee can vote on them and that the limitation described is for governance actions. If not then you have a segment in the Interim Constitution defining what info actions are, without being able to uphold that info actions adhere to that definition.

In conclusion to this question the Intersect Council believes that this info action can be judged for its constitutionality.

Is an info action in Japanese a valid info action when it is in another language than the official hash version of the Interim Constitution?

As noted in the understanding of the facts the Interim Constitution does not directly say there is a requirement for the language a governance action is written in and thus the language in itself of the info action does not go against the Interim Constitution. However the Interim Constitution does express a principle of openness in Article 1 section 1, and this has to be held up against technical capabilities in how it makes governance open and transparent for the whole ecosystem, this can be seen as a question of accessibility.

A question of accessibility

First, the Intersect Council note that Article 2 Section 1 expressess that all Cardano community members are the beneficiaries of the Interim Constitution and entitlement to its rights, privileges and protection - and this expresses globalization of the Cardano Interim constitution as it relates to the Cardano blockchain. The Cardano blockchain is for everyone no matter their race, birth place or language spoken.

Secondly, for true globalization you need accessibility for any consensus to form in a global blockchain. Accessibility needs to be held to the standards of what the governance ecosystem is capable of. The burden of making governance actions open and transparent lies on the proposer of governance actions, it is a collective decision making process with consensus thresholds as described in Article 3 section 3. Without accessibility consensus thresholds described in its collective decision making process could lose legitimacy and overall transparency could decrease.

Thirdly, the standards for what the community is capable of making accessible might evolve over time as tooling and processes enables more accessibility through translation. The usage of tooling to help facilitate governance is expressed multiple places in the Interim Constitution such as for the Constitutional Committee in Article 6 section 5 and that the community creates off-chain processes as necessary to ensure awareness of and opportunity to debate and shape all future governance is expressed in Article 3 section 7.

Is the info action accessible?

English is the language of the official version of the Cardano Interim Constitution as it is published with a hash posted on-chain. Therefore, any info action being considered in governance will need to be examined in English for comparison to the Constitution.

In this specific case the tooling to understand the proposal was sufficient given the governance action text was written in Japanese, but matched to an English translation in the supporting material. The info action has no effect on subsequent actions and states that it does not directly or indirectly request any specific changes within the Cardano ecosystem, either off-chain or on-chain. Because of this it is only a question if the sentiment is sufficiently accessible both the info action itself but also a question if the supporting material is accessible as well:

Is an info action that has supporting material in multiple other languages sufficiently accessible?

Conflicting translations in supporting materials One issue without a standardized supporting material is that of conflicting translations and/or nuances in the supporting material languages compared with the language of the governance action itself. A wider interpretation of “standardized and legible format” in article 3 section 6 includes not only the technical standards, but the standards as it relates to languages of the constitution and its governance system in terms of its legibility/ability to be read.

For governance actions with on-chain effects such as parameter changes you risk having differences across translations in supporting materials. The same risk is related to info actions that has an effect on subsequent actions such as the budget info action. This can cause potential misunderstandings or hurt transparency. In this case the info action has no on-chain effect as the understanding of facts of the Intersect Council.

Another related issue is that community sentiment info actions should be an open and transparent process protected from undue influence and manipulation per article 3 section 6 that also relates to the special form of governance action of the info action. One could imagine a sentiment polling with nuances in the different language supporting material causing undue influence or manipulation, even at the level of the community being gauged on different sentiments on different topics.

At the same time even a community sentiment expressed in a single language can be interpreted differently by how people read the proposal as a whole, so this standard cannot be judged too strictly.

This standard should always be judged relative to the balance necessary between openness and transparency compared to the possibility of manipulation or influence on governance participation. In example, a budget proposal Info Action that has effects on future treasury withdrawals will likely require a high degree of accessibility and transparency, given the effects it will have on the Cardano community. Polls of community sentiment are of less risk to the community, as they may not bind future action.

Precedent Discussion

Historically most of Cardano governance development such as CIP-1694 has used a common language (English) and this has been practiced as having sufficient accessibility but CIP-1 does not require english but an ISO 639-1 code of the target language and a method for translated files to be related to an original source language. This can also be seen as the expression of openness (any language allowed) vs accessibility issues such as understanding what is the source material vs supporting translation material.

Counter Argument Discussion

While there is nothing wrong with using an Info Action to make a declaration, it appears that this issue is not “constitutional” in nature. Therefore, while this governance action is not “unconstitutional” and therefore undeserving of a “No” vote by the Intersect Council, it is reasonable to take the position that it is “non-constitutional” in the fact that it does not apply to the operations of the Cardano network. It in fact declares itself to be purely an action of sentiment.

There may be future declarations like this proposed as Info Actions. Some of them may be controversial and express values that not all members of the Cardano community agree with. In these cases, it may be tempting for members of the Constitutional Committee to attempt to divine from the Constitution whether or not the declaration is in line with Cardano’s values. Therefore it may be wise to consider Abstaining from all such votes.

Conclusion

The info action presented in Japanese with an English translation is sufficiently accessible. The info action is constitutional.

Intersect's position on the ICC and our Charter

Abstract

Intersect was incorporated in Wyoming, USA, on December 8 2023, as a not-for-profit, members-based organization. Intersect’s mandate is to advance Cardano’s open development through our members, including management of Cardano’s core repositories and associated open source projects. Intersect also orchestrates and coordinates Cardano’s technical roadmap (including continuity) and supports and facilitates the bootstrapping and rollout of Cardano’s governance program.

Intersect’s position on the Interim Constitutional Committee (ICC) as one member of a 7 member body, is an unelected seat during the interim period (max. term 73 epochs from the first stage of the Chang upgrade taking effect on mainnet). Once Cardano has exited the bootstrapping phase, ada holders will be able to replace the ICC via on-chain governance action. The membership body will decide whether Intersect should stand for election to the Constitutional Committee when the ICC term ends in the summer of 2025.

Given Intersect’s constitutional role, its seat on the ICC will be distinct from day-to-day operations, committees, and working groups. During the interim period, Intersect’s seat will be referred to as the ‘Intersect Constitutional Council’ (henceforth, ‘Council’).

Drafting the Charter

The new Council's first order of business was to confirm the suggested provisions and motivations, and approve a final version of the Charter, with all Council members of the Council signing it. Intersect’s leadership team will sign the final Charter, along with the Council. Once finalized and signed by all parties, the Charter will undergo a legal review to ensure relevant regulatory compliance. Once signed, all signees will confirm to uphold the Charter in good faith.

The final Charter is expected to evolve and be amended frequently during the interim period as the Council matures and improves its operational capability. The core principles and tenets will remain largely unchanged, however. A change process is described in section 7.

This Charter specifies Intersect’s early principles and approach to how it will operationalize its ICC seat. It will describe processes, ways of working, membership conditions, and Intersect’s service to the Cardano community. The Charter will also detail the safeguards and dispute resolution procedures in place.

1. Charter principles

2. Membership composition & commitment

3. Decision making, administrative processes, and ways-of-working

4. Key management, custody, and security arrangements

5. Conflicts of interest and dispute resolution

6. Role of Intersect’s staff

7. Charter change process & versioning

Some clauses and terms may occasionally overlap with other sections. For the sake of completeness, there may be instances of duplication.

Definitions

• Full Council includes Full Members and Alternates

• Full Members are individual Intersect members either representing themselves or their organization, depending on the membership tier, on Intersect’s Council.

• Alternates are considered members of the Council without voting rights unless called upon to temporarily replace a full member due to a conflict of interest, resignations, inactivity, or voting deadlock.

1 - Core principles

1.1 The Council agrees to uphold the interim Constitution and adjudicate on all governance actions based on their constitutionality.

1.2 The Charter and its provisions will be upheld in good faith at all times.

1.2 The Council and its decisions will be transparent and made available to the Cardano community within a reasonable time frame.

1.3 The Council will be composed of Intersect members, subject to 1.31.

• 1.31 Individual Council members cannot be represented elsewhere on the ICC, either individually or via their organization. For example, the Council cannot have representatives from the 3 pioneer entities (Cardano Foundation, EMURGO, and IOG) or be part of an elected consortium since they are already represented on the ICC.

1.4 The Council will serve its term in accordance with limits given to Intersect’s seat on the ICC (notwithstanding arbitration options described in the dispute resolution section, nor the on-chain checks and balances as described in CIP-1694).

1.5 The Council may abstain from voting on governance actions that may wholly or partially benefit Intersect. There are many permutations to beneficiaries of decisions, and Intersect’s staff will assist in clarifying the conflicts of interest register.

1.6 Governance actions that wholly or partially benefit a member/s of the Council will require a conflict of interest declaration, and impacted members may abstain from serving on the Council until a decision is reached. The Council’s Chair will call for a motion to either proceed acknowledging conflicts and/or Alternates will step in to maintain quorum or abstain entirely.

2 - Membership composition, oath, and commitment

2.1 All Council members must be paid-up members of Intersect (either as an individual or as an employee of an enterprise member) and maintain a level of ‘good standing’ as defined in the membership agreement.

2.2 Council members can be individuals or represent their organization. However, all members must be named individuals and membership is non-transferable.

2.3 The Council (at least in the interim phase) will comprise seven full members and three alternates. Alternates will replace full members in the case of prolonged absence, conflicts of interest, resignations, motion to remove a member, or voting deadlock. Alternates will be invited to all meetings and will participate in full, with no voting rights unless called by the Chair to replace a full member.

2.4 The Council shall select a Chair from the full members. The Chair will rotate every three months and have limited scope, but will include tie-break powers in the case of a voting deadlock, represent the Council in dispute resolutions, and be able to call meetings among other areas as described throughout this Charter.

2.5 All Council members (Full and Alternates) are expected to be active, and will be considered inactive if they are absent for three meetings in any three month period. Inactivity can trigger clause 5.4.

2.6 Members may resign by giving four weeks written notice to the Chair. The resignation will trigger a by-election process to elevate one Alternate.

2.7 All members will sign a conflict of interest register (besides this Charter) before accepting their role.

2.8 All members are treated as equals, and will be afforded the same opportunity to share their position on a governance action, process, or procedural subject.

2.9 All members agree not to be an ‘open or public’ DRep (ie openly accepting delegations) whilst serving in their role.

3 - Decision making, administrative processes, and ways of working

3.1 The seven members of the Council will reach a decision by simple majority vote, requiring a minimum 3-2 (quorum is 5) to vote yay, nay, or abstain pertaining to the constitutionality of a governance action.

3.2 To reach a decision, it’s expected the Council will seek technical, legal, and other external sources of information. This can include, but may not be limited to, the technical, parameter, and civic committees within Intersect.

3.3 If abstentions result in a voting deadlock, all three alternates will be called forward to vote. In the event of a tie (5:5), the Chair will have the casting vote.

3.4 Upon reaching a decision, the Chair will formally instruct Intersect to vote in accordance with the Council’s wishes (see more under ‘key management’).

3.5 The Council will initially convene on a weekly basis during the bootstrapping phase. With Council approval, the Chair can alter this depending on governance action volume or for procedural reasons.

3.6 In special circumstances, the Chair can convene a special meeting by giving at least 48 hours notice to the Council. Also, the Chair will inform the Council if a full ICC meeting is called by other members of the ICC.

3.7 The Council will commit to publishing the rationale within 72 hours of a decision being reached, including the meeting recording of that decision being made.

3.8 The Council Chair will be invited to executive committee meetings for holistic awareness to technical and governance outputs from across Intersect.

3.9 The Council is currently an unpaid body, but it is anticipated remuneration will be a discussion point for the Council in collaboration with Intersect professional staff.

3.10 An appointed Secretary will keep pace with the flow of information on-chain, including governance action submissions and expiry dates, ensuring the Council understands critical timelines in which to reach a decision.

4 - Credential management and security arrangements

4.1 During the interim period, Intersect’s Constitutional Committee credentials will be in the legal custody of Intersect and fully managed by Intersect staff (subject to clause 4.3).

4.3 Intersect staff, including the board and executive team, have no authority to use the keys without formal instruction from the Council. For security purposes, key holders will remain confidential.

5 - Conflicts of interest and dispute resolution

5.1 All members will be required to declare conflicts of interest before joining the Council. The Secretary will maintain an up-to-date log at every meeting.

5.2 The Chair can propose the removal of a Council member. This requires a supermajority (6:3) decision by the Council. This decision should specify the alleged Charter breach/es (inactivity, for example), Intersect’s Code of Conduct, and/or Intersect’s membership agreement.

5.41 Once verified by Intersect’s governing board, the offending member will be notified and an Alternate will fill the vacancy. Similarly to a member resigning, this will trigger a by-election to select a new Alternate.

5.3 The Council can be dissolved if a petition by the Intersect membership base is presented to the governing board with at least 51% of the membership signing.

• 5.31 Once verified, the governing board and executive team will dissolve the Council in its current state and assume responsibility for fulfilling Intersect’s role on the ICC. However, the election process to elect a new Council must commence no later than 14 days after the dissolution. This clause does not at any time supersede the on-chain safeguards to submit a no-confidence vote.

5.4 Upon receiving formal instruction from the Council, if the agreed decision is not carried out in accordance with the Council’s wishes, a formal investigation will immediately commence, including the option for disciplinary action against named individuals. This may include sanctions such as suspension and dismissal.

5.5 If Intersect ceases to exist as a legal entity or winding down notices are submitted, the Council will be notified and dissolved with immediate effect. Intersect professional staff will resign from the ICC by submitting the relevant transaction to take effect on-chain.

6 - Role of Intersect and its staff

6.1 Under Intersect’s second pillar - administrate and champion Cardano’s community-led governance implemented by CIP-1694 - Intersect and its staff will remain neutral and at all times act as servant-leaders to the Council and Intersect’s membership base.

6.2 To support the Council, Intersect will appoint a permanent Secretary, allowing all members to fulfill their role to the best of their ability without too heavy a burden on administrative tasks. Also, technical and communication resources will be available to the Council when required.

6.3 A senior member of Intersect’s staff will act in an observer capacity at all formal governance action meetings, but will not participate in debate or discourse. The Council may call upon the named individual to clarify a procedural question or request an action, but said individual shall remain impartial and objective at all times.

6.4 Intersect’s leadership, including the executive team and governing board, will have no authority or responsibility over decisions taken by the Council, and will only act under formal instruction to vote in accordance with the Council’s wishes.

7 - Charter change process and versioning

7.1 This charter will be regularly reviewed for adherence and accuracy once in effect. It must be reviewed at least every three months during the interim period, after which it is expected to be reviewed annually if the membership agrees to stand for election in 2025.

7.2 This charter can be amended at any time, but requires all Council members (including alternates) to be present, approving with a super-majority threshold (7:3). All Council members (including Intersect leadership) will be required to re-sign their commitment to upholding the charter within 72 hours of any new version coming into effect.

7.3 The Secretary of the Council will maintain all records.

—

END OF CURRENT DRAFT

Summary

The info action poll for calling Chang hf+1 HOSKY hard fork is constitutional.

Understanding of facts

The format of the proposal is valid.

The Intersect Constitutional Council (CC) notes that the proposal is not currently fully viewable in govtools with data missing. This is due to a limitation with the current GovTool. Intersect CC believes the proposal is still constitutional in terms of a valid format for the proposal. It is an info action per technical standards of CIP-1694 and Article 3 Section 5 of the interim Constitution. IPFS is a standardized and legible format. The document has a url and a hash for the off-chain content. It is currently not a constitutional requirement to follow a specific standard, say CIP-100 or CIP-108, and the requirements of verifying an unedited document can still be achieved with the document hash. There are currently no established routines for what supporting material is needed for the naming of a hard fork and thus the question is only whether it meets the standards for sufficient rationale.

The type of info action is a poll for sentiment

The Intersect CC notes that the text is worded as a proposal, hence the phrase "I propose." This use of natural language indicates to the reader that the text is putting a suggestion forward for others to consider. The Intersect CC understands this info action to be a poll for community sentiment. The info action is not binding on-chain as CIP-1694. Article 3 Section 5 of the Cardano interim Constitution identifies the info action as a special type of governance action that allows community sentiment to be gauged without committing to any on-chain change. As for any subsequent governance actions and the binding effect of the info action on them, the Intersect CC notes that there is no specific mention of requirements for naming of hard forks in the interim Constitution. It is up to the community to establish such processes or define them in a final Constitution.

The role of the Constitutional Committee is not to express its sentiment on an info action, but to vote on its constitutionality

Another question raised about the facts is: if the info action is a poll for sentiment, does that sentiment polling also extend to the Constitutional Committee itself? Article 6 Section 1 expresses that "The Constitutional Committee shall be limited to voting on the constitutionality of governance actions". It is therefore the understanding of the Intersect CC that if an info action is a poll for sentiment it is not a poll for sentiment from the Intersect CC, but a vote on whether the info action is constitutional or not.

Rationale

The question for the Intersect CC is what is sufficient rationale for an info action sentiment poll on naming a hard fork for it to be constitutional?

A minimal standard of sufficient for all governance actions related to the Cardano Blockchain in article 3 section 6.

A natural language interpretation of "Sufficient rationale shall be provided to justify the requested change to the Cardano Blockchain". in Article 3 Section 6 means this standard relates to actual on-chain changes to the Cardano blockchain itself.

However, a wider interpretation has a more pragmatic merit in that all actions related to the Cardano blockchain that has any effect on the blockchain should have sufficient standards - for example, if the naming of a hard fork is universally and objectively offensive eg, "torture person X", therefore damaging the legitimacy of Cardano, or seen as damaging the intended function of the info action as a polling method it might violate a wider interpretation. Because of this, even when no technical or process standards are established, there are still minimal constitutional standards a governance action should be tested against.

Info actions that could have a binding effect on further governance actions

There is an example in the interim Constitution for treasury withdrawals - in Appendix I Section 3 treasury-04 where a threshold of 50% for active stake of DReps voting yes is required for a budget for treasury withdrawals to be able to be ratified.

This threshold could be reached by a previous info action on a budget and is an example of an info action having a binding effect for a subsequent governance action, as it could be used for the requirement in the treasury-04 guardrail. In terms of this being a requirement for the naming of a hard fork there is currently no regulation on the process in the interim Constitution and thus there is no higher threshold or standard other than any minimum standards such as discussed above.

The rationale given is sufficient

In the proposal the rationale given is "Saying Chang-1, Chang-2, Chang+1 is confusing for users and media. Call the next hard fork HOSKY Hard Fork for the sake of clarity."

This meets the minimum standard as the name proposed is not objectively offensive and does not violate the Cardano interim Constitution. There are no technical standards this naming proposal needs to fulfill. There are currently no established routines for any thresholds of info actions binding future governance actions related to naming hard forks in the interim Constitution. There is also no established process giving requirements for type of arguments or rationale for such an info action of a hard fork name.

Based on this it is concluded that the rationale given is sufficient.

Precedent discussion

Hard forks, development phases and ledger eras on Cardano have had names. During the Alanzo ledger era Cardano had an inter-era hard fork with no name during the Goguen phase (See CIP 0059 for a table of the hardforks). Two recent hard forks have been named after a community member in memory of Vasil Stoyanov Dabov or Cardano researchers in memory of Phil Chang. The process for naming hard forks during participatory governance has not yet been established.

Conclusion

The rationale given meets the minimum standards of the Interim Constitution for a rationale for an info action poll. The info action is constitutional.

Real talk from those Living the constitution, one vote at a time

Hello everyone, Being a member of the Interim Constitutional Committee (ICC) for Cardano has been one of the most unique and impactful experiences I've had within this ecosystem. It’s a role that often gets discussed, so I wanted to share a bit about what it’s really like from the inside.

Our primary function isn't to drive specific policies or push personal agendas. Instead, our mandate is very focused yet profoundly important: we act as stewards of the Cardano Constitution. Our core responsibility is to evaluate governance actions and vote on whether they align with the principles and rules laid out in our ratified Constitution. It sounds straightforward, and in a way it is, but the depth of that responsibility is immense.

We are called to be guardians of principle. This means ensuring that every decision taken, every proposal considered, respects the shared values and foundational agreements that bind our ecosystem together. It’s a constant exercise in neutrality, requiring integrity and a deep focus. It's less about what any individual member wants and entirely about whether a proposed action is constitutional.

What Makes Serving on the ICC So Rewarding?

I’ve found this role incredibly fulfilling for several reasons:

1. It’s Real Governance in Action: This isn't just a theoretical debate. We are actively applying constitutional principles in real-time. Each vote contributes to building a robust, rule-based governance culture – something essential for Cardano's global aspirations.

2. The Learning Curve is Immense: The depth of understanding you gain is incredible. Not only about the intricacies of Cardano's governance model, but also about human collaboration, the evolution of complex systems, and the critical importance of shared values and clarity.

3. It Strengthens Our Community: While our role is specific, the interactions and collaborations are deeply meaningful. This includes discussions within the ICC itself, as well as engagement with the broader Cardano community. There's a strong sense that you're part of a collective effort.

4. It’s Genuinely Engaging (and yes, even fun!): We approach our constitutional duties with the utmost seriousness, but that doesn't mean there isn't room for collegiality, personal growth, and genuine connection among members.

Valuable Lessons We’ve Learned So Far:

This journey has been rich with insights. Here are a few key takeaways:

• Clarity is Power: The more precise and clear our interpretation and application of the Constitution, the greater the community's confidence in the governance system.

• Impartiality is an Active Practice: Maintaining neutrality isn't about being disengaged. It's about being grounded in principle, present in the moment, and committed to fairness.

• Trust is Earned, Continuously: Every vote we cast, every explanation we provide, and every discussion we participate in helps to build and reinforce trust in this ambitious decentralized governance experiment we are all a part of.

Thinking of Applying for the Next Round?

If you are someone who holds clear principles in high regard, can maintain focus amidst complexity, and is passionate about playing a vital role in anchoring Cardano’s evolving governance, then serving on the CC might be your calling.

The Constitutional Council of lntersect

Intersect staff supports the Council by providing a permanent Secretary to lighten the administrative burden, and a senior observer of meetings; neither individual has voting rights, or participates in debate or discourse. During the bootstrapping phase the Council meet weekly, with ongoing meetings called by the Chair and agreed by the Council.

Meet the Intersect Constitutional Council

Hosky

Jose Miguel De Gambo

Mercy Fordwoo

Mauro Agustin Andreoli

Ubio Obu

Ian Hartwell

Juan Sierra

Adam Rusch (observer)

Useful Resources

Regarding governance protocol parameter update action

51f495aa23f4b3b3aa90afde4a0e67823bb7ac4ac65f5ffbb138373b863f2f74#0

Summary

The Intersect Council votes the proposed protocol parameter update unconstitutional due to missing rationale and without correct changes intended by the proposal.

rationaleStatement

Understanding of facts

The protocol parameter change governance action is a proposal to modify plutus V3 cost models as per the title of the proposal “Plutus V3 Cost Model Parameter Changes Prior to Chang#2” however the rationale in the anchored file is no longer to be found. It is the Intersect Councils impression that due to an error the protocol changes were submitted on a node v9 and this meant that the node discarded proposed changes that would have been included with a node v10. Due to this error it was decided to remove the rationale to avoid confusion for votes on what proposal was the valid one to vote on. We also note that the proposal does not propose any network changes given this error.

Rationale:

The question is if a protocol parameter change proposal that is not as intended by the proposer is a constitutional proposal?

Article 3 section 6 paragraph 2 reads that “Any governance action proposal reaching the on-chain governance stage shall be identical in content as to the final off-chain version of such governance action proposal.”

In this case the action proposed included cost model parameter changes while the version put on-chain would not be identical to the intended off-chain version. The Intersect Council believes that the intent of how the final off-chain version should look like matters for the interpretation of what is the final off-chain version. One of this paragraphs functions is to ensure that there is no mismatch between what is proposed and what ends up as the final off-chain version. Here in effect nothing is proposed due to a error and this is not matching the intent nor any changes in any off-chain version.

Also due to the rationale being changed a question becomes if an on purpose removed rationale makes a proposal unconstitutional?

Article 3 section 6 paragraph 1 reads that “Any governance action submitted to Ada holders for approval shall require a standardized and legible format including a URL and hash linked to documented off-chain content. Sufficient rationale shall be provided to justify the requested change to the Cardano Blockchain. The rationale shall include, at a minimum, a title, abstract, reason for the proposal, and relevant supporting materials.” In this case the documented off-chain content was removed. As in our understanding of the facts section this was likely done to remove confusion in what proposal to vote for. In general a removed off-chain document will likely make a proposal unconstitutional but there could be circumstances such as a last minute bug when the community had all read the supporting documents that could in theory make a proposal still valid. One of the intents of not having a change can be read in the last paragraph of the article: “All Ada holders shall have the right to ensure that the process for participating in, submitting and voting on governance actions is open and transparent and is protected from undue influence and manipulation.” A proposal for protocol parameter changes without supporting material for those changes are not sufficiently transparent and is unconstitutional. We also note this missing supporting material does not match the material that was socialized before the proposal.

A small note of independence

Due to this being the first time Intersect is submitting a governance action the Intersect Council notes we as a council will vote strictly based on the constitutionality of governance actions including those from Intersect. The Intersect Constitutional Council is a separate body from the Technical Steering Committee who requested this parameter change to be put forward.

precedentDiscussion

counterargumentDiscussion

conclusion

The Intersect Council votes the protocol parameter change unconstitutional due to missing rationale and changes not as the intent of the proposal.

internalVote

"internalVote": {

"constitutional": 0,

"unconstitutional": 8,

"abstain": 0,

"didNotVote": 0

}

Regarding governance protocol parameter update action

b2a591ac219ce6dcca5847e0248015209c7cb0436aa6bd6863d0c1f152a60bc5#0

Summary

The Intersect Constitutional Council votes the action to be Constitutional.

rationaleStatement

Rationale:

Understanding of facts

The format of the proposal

The Protocol Parameter Update (b2a591ac219ce6dcca5847e0248015209c7cb0436aa6bd6863d0c1f152a60bc5#0) is a resubmission of a previous Protocol Parameter Update action (51f495aa23f4b3b3aa90afde4a0e67823bb7ac4ac65f5ffbb138373b863f2f74#0). As a result of the previous action containing a submission error, the on-chain / off-chain metadata was intentionally broken to discourage any votes in favour of the proposal.

This updated submission is a thorough proposal that now satisfies the requirements laid out in Article III Section 6 paragraphs 1-3. It is “written in a standardised and legible format with a URL and hash linked to documented off-chain content”. The on-chain /off-chain versions of the proposal match (unlike the previously broken proposal) and as per the Interim Constitution, the Intersect Constitutional Council agrees that the Protocol Parameter Change governance action has “undergone sufficient technical review and scrutiny” in conjunction with “addressing any expected impacts on the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem”. The content of the proposal

The Protocol Parameter Update action states that this proposal does not make any changes to existing chain parameter settings but proposes additions to the already existing Plutus V3 Cost Model in order to make new primitives available for use in Protocol Version 10. It should be noted that this proposal is also dependent on the next hard fork as a result. While this proposal may be ratified prior to the next hard fork, the primitives only become available following the change to Protocol Version 10. The proposal also acknowledges that the affected parameters cannot be checked by the automated guardrails script and provides a consistency statement pertaining to the relevant parameters (PCM-01, PCM-02 and PCM-03). A reversion plan has also been provided as part of the proposal, in the event of any unforeseen negative consequences. The changes made as a result of this proposal passing can be reverted by reinstating the previous Plutus Cost Model values and omitting any settings for the new primitives. Such a simple reversion plan can be seen as indicative of the low-risk nature of this particular Protocol Parameter Update action. Multiple supporting links have been provided at the end of the governance action.

Technical review While the Intersect Constitutional Council would usually prefer to seek out external expert opinion on technical proposals such as this one, the multiple supporting links provided in this instance have been deemed to provide enough corroborating sources to make a sufficient cross-referenced analysis of the proposal’s security and viability.

A small note on independence

While the governance action in question has been submitted by the Technical Steering Committee at Intersect, the Intersect Constitutional Council is an independent body consisting of community members separate from Intersect employees. Following on from internal discussions during the early months of its formation, the Council continues to evaluate and assert its independence during its weekly meetings. As such, the Intersect Constitutional Council is comfortable providing a Constitutional verdict on this action rather than merely abstaining with the intention of appearing neutral.

precedentDiscussion

counterargumentDiscussion

conclusion

The Intersect Constitutional Council votes the action to be Constitutional.

Conclusion

internalVote

"internalVote": {

"constitutional": 6,

"unconstitutional": 0,

"abstain": 0,

"didNotVote": 0

}

References

Summary

The info action “Should K increased?” is not constitutional due to not having sufficient rationale to justify the action.

Rationale Statement

Understanding of facts

The format of the proposal It is an info action per technical standards of CIP-1694 and article 3 section 5 of the Interim Constitution.

Regarding the wording of K-parameter While the K parameter has long-been discussed amongst the Cardano community, it should be noted that the particular parameter to which it historically referred is now officially known as stakePoolTargetNum within the Interim Constitution guardrails section (Appendix I: Section 2.4). While this in itself may or may not affect the constitutionality of the info action, it does raise an educational opportunity. “stakePoolTargetNum” is a more accessible parameter name for wider ecosystem participants to understand rather than the previous vagueness of “K”, and it also raises the importance of the accurate usage of parameter names in any future governance action.

The info action as the Intersect Council understands it The info action informs of the proposer's understanding of the K and a0 parameter. It is stated to “by no means a suggestion of what Cardano protocol parameters should be modified to or if they should be modified at this time. The goal of this governance action is to increase governance participation before the next hardfork”. However the title of the proposal is a question if K should be increased: “Should K increased?”. The Intersect Council interprets this to be that the proposal does not state what specifically it should be changed into or if it needs to be modified at this time, but that as the title says, the info action raises the question if K should be increased and that is the subject of the community poll.

The supporting material is not sufficient Article 6 section 3 covers any governance action submitted to Ada holders for approval and has standards in terms of sufficient rationale to justify “requested change to the Cardano Blockchain” and with a minimum a title, abstract, reason for the proposal, and relevant supporting materials. In this case the info action asks “Should K increased?” does not include sufficient relevant supporting material per the opinion of the Intersect Council as the provided supporting material is A) a link to Atrium labs that is not sufficiently relevant, B) a link to a video by Atrium Labs in relation to Cardano governance that is not sufficiently relevant and C) an educational post on what is cryptocurrency by Atrium Labs that is not sufficiently relevant. The info action itself gives a short description of K without going into any details of how an increase of K (as per the title of the proposal) would affect the Cardano blockchain, and seems more relevant for promoting Atrium Labs, than for informing the voters on the community poll question to a sufficient degree.

Rationale:

Does the info action fulfill the requirements in the constitution? The action is an info action gauging sentiment. In this case in regards to governance participation and related to K and a0, so it fulfills the requirements in article 3 section 5 of being an info action for community sentiment gauging.

The info action only partially fulfills the standards in article 3 section 6 for all governance actions. It is in a standardized and legible format and includes a url and a hash linked to a document off-chain. However, the supporting material is not relevant and not sufficient for the question asked in the community sentiment poll.

Given that the info action only partially fulfills the requirements in article 3 section 6 it is not constitutional.

The Intersect Council notes we only vote on the constitutionality of the rationale not being sufficient, and have not supported or gone against any increase or decrease in K(stakePoolTargetNum).

A discussion of the intent of info actions and standards related to info actions being tools for community sentiment As discussed in the Intersect Councils rationale for governance action 15f82a365bdee483a4b03873a40d3829cc88c048ff3703e11bd01dd9e035c916#0 (Hosky HF) the Intersect Council believes there are minimum standards to info actions. To quote our previous rationale: “For example one could risk not upholding the standards in article 3 section 6 of governance if the council abstained from voting on the constitutionality of info actions that were purely commercial advertisements without any rationale, and especially so if there were multiple such info actions making it harder for the community to read and digest community sentiment gauging info actions.”

We believe by ensuring that info actions have sufficient rationales and are not seen as pure commercial advertisements we ensure the integrity of the info action as a community sentiment gauging tool and that in turn promotes effective governance. The Intersect Council also share the sentiment of the Cardano Foundations rationale in their no vote on the action 7fd6429add8f2611ad8d48c0cc49101463093aec285faea402e8cfde78ea58d7#0 (“Should K increased?”) where they highlight article 1 section 1 to uphold transparency, openness and responsible governance and that the lack of relevant supporting material and the potential promotional nature of the proposal does not align with responsible governance practice.

The Intersect Council would also highlight the opportunity for the community to refine info actions as community sentiment gauges with off-chain discussions in the various tools online before submitting for the entire Cardano community on-chain. By promoting a culture of such discussions we ensure that on-chain governance is transparent and where community sentiment is done at a stage when the community is informed on a topic thus promoting effective governance. Polls related to changing protocol parameters should at a minimum have a discussion of what the proposer believes would be the effect of the proposed change or range of changes proposed.

Conclusion

The info action “Should K increased?” is not constitutional.

Internal Vote

• Constitutional: 0

• Unconstitutional: 7

• Abstain: 0

• Did Not Vote: 0

What is the Intersect Constitutional Council?

Intersect’s position on the interim Constitutional Committee as one member of a ten member body, is an unelected seat during the interim period. Intersect’s role on the interim Constitution Committee will be separated from day-to-day operations, committees and working groups, and in the interim period will be referred to as the “Intersect Constitutional Council”. The Council will be made up of ten Intersect members, with an Intersect-provided secretary and senior observer in supporting roles.

Who sits on the Council?

Members of the Council can be individual Intersect members or represent their organization. However, all members of the Council must be named individuals and membership on behalf of an organization is non-transferable between individuals.

The Council (at least in the interim phase) will comprise seven full members and three alternates. Alternates will replace full members in the case of prolonged absence, conflict of interest or voting deadlock. Alternates will be invited to all meetings and will participate in full, bar voting rights unless called to replace a full member.

How will the Council vote on governance actions?

The Council will reach a decision by simple majority vote, requiring a minimum 3-2 (quorum is 5) to vote yay, nay, or abstain pertaining to the constitutionality of a governance action.

Upon reaching a decision, the Chair will formally instruct the nominated Intersect staff member to instruct the key holders to vote in accordance with the Council’s wishes.

When does the Intersect Constitution Council take effect?

Intersect’s Constitutional Council will be announced on July 5th. Training will take place during the week of July 15th.

The full interim Constitution Committee will be operational on mainnet from the date of the first stage of the Chang upgrade (known as Chang 1) taking effect on mainnet.

What does Intersect seat on the Interim Constitutional Committee (ICC) mean?

Intersect’s position on the ICC as one member of the seven member body, is an unelected seat during the interim period (a maximum term of 73 epochs from the date of the Chang upgrade taking effect on mainnet). The membership will decide whether Intersect should stand for election to the full Constitutional Committee in the summer of 2025.

Given Intersect’s constitutional role, its seat on the ICC will be distinct from day-to-day operations, committees, and working groups - forming a new group tasked with operationalizing Intersect’s interim CC seat.

How else can I get my voice heard?

There are many ways to have your say on the development of Cardano’s governance:

• Contribute via community-focused committees, and working groups, including groups involved in creating a constitution draft that feeds into a broad community consultation process leading up to ratification.

• Continue to test governance features on

Here we describe the end-to-end voting flow using the council toolkit for vote transaction signing.

Proposed Steps

1. Deliberation and decision

   • Council meets and works asynchronously

   • Council deliberate on action

   • Metadata drafting

   • Vote consensus reached by the council

   • Metadata finalization

2. Building vote transaction

   • Orchestrator coordinates with council to turn metadata into correct format.

   • Orchestrator construct an unsigned transaction incorporating the specific governance action and the council's chosen consensus on the governance action; Constitutional, Unconstitutional, or Abstain.

   • Orchestrator sends the unsigned vote transaction to each voter key-holder.

3. Signing the transaction via council toolkit

   • Each voter key signer uploads the transaction

   • Each voter inspects the transaction, ensuring it is correct

   • Each voter produces a signature for the vote transaction

4. Collecting the Signatures/Witnesses and submission

   • Orchestrator collects all signatures and assemble the finalised signed transaction.

   • Orchestrator does final checks and then submits the vote to chain.

Regarding governance Info Action “Rename the Chang 2 Hard Fork to the Plomin Hard Fork

fff0df644d328a5367212f45bab59060bde3c4091dc96c723062896fd6197314#0

Summary

The Intersect Constitutional Council votes the action to be Constitutional.

rationaleStatement

The proposal is an Info Action governance type. It is a proposal to name the next Cardano hard fork the “Plomin Hard Fork” in memory of Cardano community contributor Matthew Plomin. The Intersect Constitutional Council has determined that the proposal meets the required standards defined in Article III section 6 of the Interim Constitution: it follows a standardized and legible format and provides an Abstract, Motivation, Rationale and Supporting Links. Additionally, the proposal aligns with the Cardano Interim Constitution’s principles:

1. Recognition of Contributions: The proposal honors a valued community member, aligning with Article II, Section 4, which encourages acknowledging contributions.

2. Participatory Governance: The proposal provides clear justification, adhering to Article III, Section 6, which requires transparency and rationale for governance actions.

3. Alignment with Principles: The name change does not compromise technical performance, security, or decentralization, respecting Article I tenets.

By fostering inclusivity and trust, this proposal reflects Cardano’s community-driven ethos and is therefore deemed constitutionally sound.

However, it is crucial to reiterate that this particular governance action was inspired by the recent passing of a beloved community member, and as such, it is emotionally charged with tremendous community sentiment. With this in mind, the Intersect Constitutional Council must emphasize that its role is to assess the constitutionality of a proposal and not the sentiment behind it. While individual members rightly have their own personal feelings on the subject, this Council aims to remain impartial to the best of its abilities when assessing this Info Action. Considering that the Chang hard fork was initially planned as a single event but divided into two phases for practical reasons, it is determined that the legacy of Chang was respected and honored. Furthermore, in keeping with the tradition of honoring prominent members of the Cardano community through the naming of hard forks, Matthew Plomin, as a distinguished member of the Cardano community, is appropriately recognized with such honors.

Should the community decide on this matter through an on-chain vote, it would mark the first instance in which the naming of a hard fork is determined in a decentralized manner. Finally, it is worth highlighting the independence of this Council as the GA was proposed by the Intersect Hard Fork Working Group.

precedentDiscussion

This council has set precedence with regards to Info Actions relating to the naming of hard forks after voting that the very first governance action, the Hosky hard fork Info Action, was constitutional. While this initial GA was the first of its kind and contained some errors, the current GA is an improvement and has been submitted free of any technical errors and, as previously mentioned, meets the standards laid out in Article III, section 6, Article II, Section 4, and the tenets of Article I. Hard forks, development phases, and ledger eras on Cardano have traditionally been named with consent of the entities who held the genesis keys of the network. Two recent hard forks have been named in memory of Cardano Community members: Vasil Stoyanov Dabov and Phil Chang.

Additionally, it is imperative to note that the process for naming hard forks during participatory governance has not yet been established and no formal process has been decided upon. However, the Intersect Constitutional Council is mindful that we are establishing a precedent for the Cardano ecosystem and this could be the beginnings of a formalized process. This Council has already established its own precedent regarding voting on Info Actions pertaining to the naming of hard forks, as the first mainnet governance action (15f82a365bdee483a4b03873a40d3829cc88c048ff3703e11bd01dd9e035c916#0) proposed naming the upcoming hard fork “Hosky.” A majority of the Intersect Constitutional Council voted “Constitutional” in that instance, thus recognizing the authority of the Cardano community to take such an action through on-chain governance.

counterargumentDiscussion

As previously outlined in the Council’s rationale counterargument discussion in the 15f82a365bdee483a4b03873a40d3829cc88c048ff3703e11bd01dd9e035c916#0 “Hosky” governance action, the same counter argument can be raised here for the Plomin Hard Fork proposal.

While this governance action is not “Unconstitutional” and therefore undeserving of a “No” vote by the Intersect Constitutional Council, it is reasonable to take the position that this GA is “non-constitutional” because it does not apply to the operations of the Cardano network. The naming of hard forks is an informal practice that has generally been done by the developers for marketing purposes. There is no on-chain mechanism where the “name” matters, so there is nothing to consider regarding constitutionality. Era names are defined at the ledger level, with the most recent eras being “Babbage” and “Conway,” which have not followed the name of a hard fork since the Alonzo hard fork. Therefore, in this instance the choice of hard fork name does not affect the Cardano blockchain.

Based on this line of reasoning, it is possible that a non-vote would be a logical course of action. However, it may be prudent to actively vote “Abstain” to signal neutrality to the community.

conclusion

The rationale given meets the minimum standards of the Interim Constitution for a rationale for an info action. The Intersect Council believes that the info action is Constitutional.

internalVote

"internalVote": {

"constitutional": 7,

"unconstitutional": 0,

"abstain": 0,

"didNotVote": 2

}

References

Regarding governance HF action ”Hard fork to Protocol Version 10 (Plomin hard fork)

0b19476e40bbbb5e1e8ce153523762e2b6859e7ecacbaf06eae0ee6a447e79b9#0

Summary

The Intersect Constitutional Council votes the Plomin hard fork action to be constitutional.

rationaleStatement

The proposal is a hard fork governance action. It is a proposal to hard fork to Protocol Major Version 10 and Minor Version 0 named the “Plomin” hard fork. Its intent is for all 7 governance actions in CIP-1694 to be enabled, and it will affect the withdrawal of staking rewards by allowing it only after delegation to a DRep (including the pre-defined abstain/no-confidence options).

The hard fork should only be valid after INTERIM-01 of having had sufficient time for DReps to register and campaign, at least 18 epochs and and it needs to pass the HARDFORK-XX guardrails in particular HARDFORK-04 “At least 85% of stake pools by active stake should have upgraded to a Cardano node version that is capable of processing the rules associated with the new protocol version.”

As the Intersect Constitutional Council understands the facts during the governance action proposal period a new node version (10.1.4) has been introduced that is meant to mitigate a risk of a potential DoS attack following the hard fork according to the release notes. These facts raises a principle question if the HARDFORK-04 of at least 85% of stake pools should be upgrade requires a node version that does not introduce a security risk in the network after the hard fork.

The language of the guardrail in HARDFORK-04 itself is silent on this, it simply says that the node version is capable of processing the rules associated with the new protocol version.

The most relevant article in the Interim Constitution is the article 3 section 6 paragraph 3 that highlights the requirement of sufficient technical review and scrutiny mandated by the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails to ensure that the governance actions does not endanger the security, functionality or performance of the Cardano Blockchain. Here we see that the Guardrails are intended to protect against security issues as one of their functions. This is also highlighted in the introduction to the guardrails “To implement Cardano Blockchain on-chain governance pursuant to CIP-1694, it is necessary to establish sensible guardrails that will enable the Cardano Blockchain to continue to operate in a secure and sustainable way.” And that they are intended to “(...) guide the choice of sensible parameter settings and avoid potential problems with security, performance or functionality. “ In short while the wording itself in the HARDFORK-04 is of little guidance the description of the guardrails highlights its role to enable safety of the protocol and in Intersect Constitution Councils opinion this should include that a node version that if not upgraded to before a hard fork that would introduce a security risk should not be counted for in the 85% number for stake pools.

In conclusion the Intersect Constitution Council believes that the 85% number for node upgrades should only include nodes that are from a security standpoint safe to hard fork into (in this case currently only version 10.1.4).

During the Interim phase the community is in a bootstrap phase for DReps expressed in the INTERIM-01 rule reflecting the intent in CIP-1694 of such a bootstrapping phase that also has provisions before a subsequent hard fork can be ratified.

A question raised is if a sufficient number of DReps have registered and campaigned and a sufficient number of Ada holders have chosen their initial voting delegation. The time requirement in INTERIM-01 has been fulfilled but the question is this guardrail covers more than the time requirement and also covers the actual number of DReps and ada holders to cover the intent of the bootstrapping phase in CIP-1694. It also raises the question of who are to judge what is sufficient.

The wording itself suggest it is only a timing component as it starts with “to provide sufficient time (..)” however the wording of “at least” could open up for a subjective component to how long this time period should be and that the number of DReps and Ada holders is a relevant criteria in such a subjective consideration. Again if one goes to the intent of the guardrails it is clear that they should ensure the security, performance and functionality of the Cardano Blockchain and since this hard fork enables DRep voting functionality then article 3 section 6 paragraph 3 requirements for sufficient technical review and scrutiny is also of relevance. This the “at least” segment could be viewed as a requirement that if not sufficient technical review or scrutiny has been possible then more time could be extended. The question then becomes who are the relevant actors to do this sufficient review when it comes to the governance readiness?

In the Intersect Constitution Council opinion both the Council members has an independent responsibility as a layman in terms of technical scrutiny if something is obviously endangering the security, functionality or performance of the Cardano Blockchain. However a main source of readiness should come from expert organs who have access and time to track data in terms of readiness. For this hard fork the Hard Fork Working Group of Intersect is of relevance. It has members from the Civics committee and it has members who are technical experts and have been part of previous hard forks. The group has a risk document and has judged risks to be acceptable in terms of the number of DRep participants. Based on this the Intersect Constitution Council believe both the time period has passed for sufficient time and that there has been no strong objections that more time is required.

In conclusion sufficient time has elapsed for the INTERIM-01 requirements and the Intersect Constitution Council believes that the current organ to give an expert opinion on this is the Hard Fork Working Group of Intersect.

With sufficient time elapsed the main question before the Intersect Constitution Council is if the 85% threshold in Harfork-01 is met. The 85% threshold is a should and not a must rule, and was put in place for reasons such as making sure sufficient pools follow the new protocol to avoid creating a chain fork where a significant stake supports two chains. In this particular case the Intersect Constitution Council also believes the security implications of the vulnerability discovered and fixed in node version 10.1.4 should be of relevance to the threshold. Having been briefed and consulted with the Security Council the Intersect Constitution Council believes the 85% threshold is sufficient and if met the HARDFORK-01 guardrail should not block the Plomin hard fork.

This protocol version fulfills the requirements in HARDFORK-01-03 as the major version goes from 9 to 10 while the minor version of the protocol will be 0, and the threshold in HARDFORK-04 is fulfilled by these data points and additional briefings by the Security Council. HARDFORK-05-08 are met given that no new protocol parameters where introduced or depreciated and no new plutus version is introduce as the plutus primitives was included as part of Plutus v3 as stated in the governance action itself. Also Plutus costs was covered by the previous governance protocol parameter update action b2a591ac219ce6dcca5847e0248015209c7cb0436aa6bd6863d0c1f152a60bc5#0 that is enacted.

The next question is if any of the formal requirements for the governance action itself in article 3 section 6 are not met. The proposal is in a standardized and legible format and it has sufficient rationale. The question is if the governance action has sufficient technical review and scrutiny as mandated by the Cardano Blockchain Guardrails to ensure that the governance action does not endanger the security, functionality or performance of the Cardano Blockchain.

As per 20th January 2025 it is reported on the readiness page of the Hard Fork Working Group that 55% of exchanges (32 in number) are ready for the hard fork with 61.26% of liquidity ready. Major tooling and libraries, indexes and higher level tooling all report readiness for the hard fork while multiple wallet providers do the same including Hardware wallet providers and Full Node and CLI wallets. A large number of DApps has also reported readiness. In short, overall ecosystem readiness seems to indicate no critical loss of functionality by going into this hard fork.

Based on this the Intersect Constitution Council believes that the hard fork guardrails for the Plomin hard fork are met and that the governance action is constitutional.

Conclusion: The guardrails of the hard fork are met and the hard fork is constitutional.

precedentDiscussion

Cardano has a long history of hard forks without interruption to the blockchain through the hard fork Combinator technology that was first proven from Byron to Shelley hard fork in July 2020 and as an example the Goguen hard fork in September 2021. In all of these hard forks metrics were gathered in terms of ecosystem readiness and if it was safe to hard fork. This is a long tradition Cardano has in terms of ensuring that it is safe for the blockchain to transition and upgrade its technology and is reflected in its constitutional guardrail related to hard forks.

counterargumentDiscussion

conclusion

The Plomin hard fork to Protocol version 10 0b19476e40bbbb5e1e8ce153523762e2b6859e7ecacbaf06eae0ee6a447e79b9#0 is constitutional.

internalVote

"internalVote": {

"constitutional": 7,

"unconstitutional": 0,

"abstain": 0,

"didNotVote": 2

}

The Plomin hard fork Governance action metadata as hosted by the Intersect GitHub

The Hard Fork Working Group readiness page as hosted by cardano upgrades documents of Intersect

The council toolkit is a web app designed to help Intersect's constitutional council conduct their on-chain activities.

It enables the migration of voting key control to the council, allowing independent voting.

For voting, the toolkit facilitates the review and verification voting transactions, without having to understand all technical details. Once detials are verified the key-holder is able to produce a witness for the transaction.

Deployment

Code via Github

To sign a vote with the Council Toolkit , you will need:

• A Chromium Browser.

• A Windows or Apple computer.

• A compatible wallet, controlling a voter key.

  • We currently recommend Lace and Eternl.

Instructions

• Toolkit is compatible with two environments : Pre-Prod and Mainnet

• Have a unsigned voting transaction ready (provided by the orchestrator)

• You are ready to produce a witness (a signature) !!

Step-by-step guide to produce a signature

• Click 'Connect Wallet'

  • Establish a connection between the wallet and the toolkit

  • Make sure you allow wallet to be used by Dapp on wallet's settings

  • Once connection is established, your voter key hash and wallet network will be displayed.

  • Upload your unsigned voter transaction (that has been sent by the 'orchestrator') by clicking UPLOAD button.

  • Upon selecting the unsigned voter transaction file , the transaction hex will be displayed.

  • Validation checks are done by clicking "CHECK TRANSACTION" button .

  • A total of 8 validation check are preformed that confirm:

    • you are a required signer.

    • you have an un-signed transaction, needed to be signed.

    • both the unsigned transaction and the wallet are in the same network.

    • the uploaded transaction is un-signed, in need for a signature(a witness).

    • the vote transaction refers Intersect's ICC credentials.

    • you are signing only one vote in the vote transaction.

    • no certificates are part of the vote transaction.

    • your key is in the Intersect's ICC hierarchy.

    • the metadata document on the hosted at the provided URL , matches the provided hash.

  • Voting details are displayed and the user needs to confirm they are correct before proceeding to sign the vote transaction.

  • After confirming the governance action ID you are voting on , the vote choice and the metadata you can proceed with signing the transaction.

  • Upon clicking on the 'SIGN TRANSACTION" button , your soft wallet is going to request you the spending password in order for the wallet to sign the transaction and create a signature (a witness)

  • Signature(the witness) then will be retrieved by our app where you can download it by clicking "DOWNLOAD" button and ready to send it to the 'orchestrator'

January 2025

Meeting 19 - 14/01/2025 - Informal meeting, no minutes recorded due to lack of quorum

July

August

September

October

November

No Council meetings were held during December 2024 due to the Constitutional Convention and the holiday period.